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This article presents some recent theoretical and empirical contributions to
the macroeconomic literature that challenge the perfect information hypo-
thesis. By taking into account the information frictions encountered by
economic agents, it is possible to explain some of the empirical regularities that
are difficult to rationalise in the standard framework of full information rational
expectations. As an example, we discuss how the sign, size and persistence of
the estimated effects of monetary and fiscal policies can change when the
informational frictions experienced by economic agents are taken into account. 
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How do economic agents form their expectations and make their
decisions? How can these processes be modelled in a macroeconomic
framework and what conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of
economic time series? These methodological issues have long been
among the most fundamental questions in macroeconomics. The
dominant approach – since the work of Lucas, Sargent and their co-
authors in the early 1970s – has adopted the joint hypotheses of
model-consistent or rational expectations, and of full information.1
Under these assumptions, economic agents know the structure of the
economy precisely and can perfectly observe and process all economic
information in real-time.
1. “Model-consistent or rational expectations”.Revue de l’OFCE, 157 (2018)
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whose introduction has enormously increased the sophistication of
macroeconomic models. However, over time, there has been an accu-
mulation of convincing evidence about phenomena that would be
“anomalous” in the standard framework. Recently, models that incor-
porate deviations from the full information hypothesis in the form of
“sticky information”, “noisy information” or “dispersed information”
have been proposed to explain some of the empirical regularities that
are difficult to accommodate in the standard framework, such as the
persistence of the response of macroeconomic variables to supply or
demand shocks, the delayed response of inflation to economic policy
shocks, and the autocorrelation of agents' forecast errors.
This article presents some of the ideas proposed to incorporate devi-
ations from the hypothesis of full information in the standard
framework. We also discuss some of the implications of models of
imperfect information for the estimation of the impact of macroeco-
nomic policy actions.
1. The Perfect Information Rational Expectations Framework
In his General Theory (1936), Keynes pointed out that private expec-
tations can affect macroeconomic variables. Since then, it has been
acknowledged that the expectations of private agents, households and
firms are of fundamental importance in many macroeconomic models.
In the 1960s, the direct introduction of expectations into macroeco-
nomic models became widespread and led to efforts in ad-hoc
modelling of the process through which agents were forming their
forecasts. Among others, a common representation of this process was
the adoption of “adaptive expectations”, where agents are assumed to
form expectations based on past experience. In contrast to this
approach, Muth (1961) proposed modelling agents' expectations as
being “model-consistent”, i.e. as coherent with the economy model
implied probability. 
The experience of stagflation in the 1970s led to a reconsideration
of the assumptions of the Keynesian models of the 1960s. In fact, these
models, often supplemented with adaptive expectations, implied that
macroeconomic stabilisation policies based on fiscal and monetary
expansions could be used to reduce unemployment and increase
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causal interpretation of the Phillips curve). 
To explain why policy actions were not delivering the expected
results, Lucas (1972) proposed a schematic model of islands in which
policy makers are not able to systematically exploit the relationship
between inflation and real activity (the Phillips curve). What became
known as the “Lucas critique” suggested that the use of parameters
based on past experience is a misguided way of assessing the effects of
changes in macroeconomic policies (Lucas, 1976). Indeed, when poli-
cies are changed agents incorporate the policy shift in their
expectations. This in turn implies that policy analysis obtained from
models calibrated with past data can deliver inconsistent results. Lucas
and Sargent (1979) incorporated this intuition in a general equilibrium
model featuring forward-looking agents with model-consistent
rational expectations and perfect information. In such a setting,
economic agents react to policy changes by re-optimising their deci-
sions in light of the policy change. Since then, the hypothesis of full
information rational expectations has become a fundamental building
block in macroeconomic models supporting the assumption of market
efficiency, the permanent income hypothesis, the “Ricardian” equiva-
lence, and standard asset pricing models.
This revolution has not been limited to the academic sphere, and
macroeconomic policy makers have also relied on the assumptions of
full information and rational expectations in the macroeconomic policy
models employed by central banks and finance ministries.
However, over time many empirical regularities at odds with the
perfect information framework have been reported. Examples include
the slow adjustment of prices, money non-neutrality, the delayed and
smoothed links between macroeconomic time series and the booms
and busts in financial asset prices. In addition, surveys of the expecta-
tions of households, firms and private forecasters have provided direct
evidence against the full information rational expectations hypothesis
(e.g. Pesaran and Weale, 2006). 
One of the most striking implications of the rational expectations
hypothesis concerns the Phillips curve. As private agents anticipate the
effects of economic policy decisions (changes in money supply or in
the policy interest rate for instance), they adjust their expectations (of
future inflation in this example). Hence the impact of these policies is
not real but only nominal. However, empirical work has shown that
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avenues for explaining these results have been proposed, including
models of non-rational expectations and staggered contract models in
which prices and wages are fixed for a given period.2 As we discuss in
the next section, a different approach has been to challenge the
hypothesis of perfect information to explain the empirical findings. 
2. Models of Imperfect Information
The lack of empirical support for the predictions of models of full
information rational expectations has provided motivation to explore
models in which rational agents are rational albeit limited in their
ability to acquire and process information.
In models of “sticky information”, proposed by Mankiw and Reis
(2002), private agents cannot update their information at all times, but
only infrequently. However, when they do, they can acquire full infor-
mation. Alternative approaches, called “noisy information” or “rational
inattention”, assume that agents can only observe signals about
economic variables polluted by observational errors (Woodford, 2002),
or have limits in their ability to process information in real-time and
hence have to rationally choose what information to monitor (Sims,
2003; Maćkowiak and Wiederholt, 2009; Paciello and Wiederholt,
2014).
The hypothesis of imperfect information in models with sticky infor-
mation and noisy information may be micro-founded and linked to the
inattention of economic agents to new information. This behaviour can
be explained by the cost of accessing information (see, for example,
Reis, 2006a, b) or by limited information-processing capabilities (see
among others Sims, 2003; Matějka, 2016; Matějka and McKay, 2012).3
A common feature of all these models of imperfect information is
that economic agents absorb and respond to new information only
gradually. The response of economic variables to economic policy
shocks or other structural shocks is therefore slow. This contrasts
2. Although private agents in neo-keynesian models form rational expectations and suffer no
money illusion, the theory has simply shifted the non-neutrality of private agents' behavior to the
constraints private agents are facing: the different types of frictions.
3. The central idea of rational inattention models is that private agents have limited attention and
therefore need to decide how to allocate their attention on the vast amount of information available.
In this theory of rational inattention, however, private agents make their decision optimally.
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models in which economic agents can process and respond to new
information immediately.
Other classes of models proposing deviations from the hypothesis
of rational expectations with full information have been proposed. One
of these alternatives is the “bounded rationality” model proposed by
Sargent (1999), where agents are limited in their knowledge of the
economic model but are rational in their decision-making. Similarly,
Gabaix (2014) proposed a model in which the economic agents adopt
a simplified model of the economy and pay attention only to some of
the relevant variables. This approach is motivated by the limited
capacity of agents to monitor and understand macroeconomic varia-
bles and their interactions. The “natural expectations” model of Fuster
et al. (2010) proposes a framework where economic agents use simpli-
fied models to predict a complex reality. Along the same line,
“diagnostic expectations” refer to a different approach in which
economic agents have imperfectly defined models of the economy.
This type of expectations is justified by the representation heuristics of
Kahneman and Tversky (1972), which describes the non-Bayesian
tendency of economic agents to overestimate the probability of a char-
acteristic in a group when this characteristic is representative or
symptomatic of the group. Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010) and Bordalo
et al. (2016) describe the formation of expectations based on this
behavioural bias. Economic agents with diagnostic expectations over-
weight future events that become more likely based on the most recent
data, which may explain both the excessive volatility of some markets
and an excessive reaction to new information.
Finally, learning models (Evans and Honkapohja, 2012) offer a
complementary approach to the issue. In these models, economic
agents are rational and have full access to new economic information,
however they don't know the parameters that govern the economic
model. Agents thus act as econometricians and try to learn about the
relations describing the economy's dynamics over time, given the
observed data. Expectations are then formed by using tentative esti-
mates. This type of model helps to explain the persistence of inflation
expectations (Orphanides and William, 2005; Milani, 2007; Branch
and Evans, 2006). 
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Models of sticky information, noisy information and rational
inattention provide common emerging predictions, empirically docu-
mented by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) using survey data. 
In this class of model, following a macroeconomic shock the
average forecast in the economy will respond less than the actual vari-
able being forecast. Hence if, for example, a shock lowers inflation over
a number of periods, economic agents' average expectation of inflation
will not decline immediately as much as actual inflation does. In a sticky
information model, this is due to the fact that some of the agents are
unaware that the shock has occurred and do not change their expecta-
tions. In noisy information models, private agents receive signals
indicating higher inflation but change their expectations only gradually
because of their uncertainty about whether the higher signals repre-
sent noise or real innovations. In models of rational inattention, agents
can only pay limited attention to inflation data hence do not fully
adjust their expectations on impact.
Another prediction, common to all of these models, is that the
average of the ex-post forecast errors is predictable from the ex-ante
revisions of the average forecast. This contrasts with the full informa-
tion case in which ex-post forecast errors cannot be predicted. In the
sticky information model, this reflects the fact that some agents do not
update their information and therefore their forecasts remain
unchanged, which creates a correlation between the average forecasts
at different times. In the noisy information model, the economic
agents update their forecasts only gradually because of the presence of
noise in the signals they receive. 
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) test these predictions on US
data and Andrade and Le Bihan (2013) on European data, and they
provide evidence of empirical regularities compatible with models
featuring informational frictions.
Recent empirical research has also highlighted omnipresent and
systematic deviations from the predictions of rational expectations
models with full information using survey data. This empirical evidence
is consistent with the predictions of imperfect information models.
Among other contributions, Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers (2004), Dovern
et al. (2012) and Andrade et al. (2016) use the dispersion of responses
in survey data to assess the extent to which the persistent informa-
tional model can replicate some of the characteristics of the
Imperfect Information in Macroeconomics 187expectations of private forecasters and consumers. Using epidemiolog-
ical models, Carroll (2003) suggested that information is transferred
from professional forecasters to consumers over time through the fore-
casters' publications. Carvalho and Nechio (2014) found that many
households report expectations that are inconsistent with monetary
policy measures.
Gourinchas and Tornell (2004), Bacchetta, Mertens and van
Wincoop (2009), and Piazzesi and Schneider (2011) in turn identify the
potential links between systematic forecast errors in survey expecta-
tions and empirical puzzles in asset markets.
Adam and Padula (2003) have shown that empirical estimates of the
slope of the neo-Keynesian Phillips curve have the expected sign when
using survey measures of inflation expectations, while this is not gener-
ally the case when one adopts empirical specifications based on full
information assumptions. More recently, Coibion and Gorodnichenko
(2015) and Coibion et al. (2017) tried to explain the missing disinfla-
tion following the Great Recession by the partial de-anchoring of
consumers' and producers' inflation expectations between 2009 and
2011 due to large oil shocks.
4. Imperfect Information and the Identification of Structural 
Shocks 
Most of the macroeconometric literature studying the effects of
policy shocks – monetary and fiscal – is based on mechanisms and
insights derived from models of full information and rational expecta-
tions. However, a number of empirical studies have argued that the
presence of informational frictions could modify the identification
problem along several dimensions.4
In an economy without informational frictions, the econometrician
has to align the econometric model's information set to the representa-
tive agent's. Conversely, when the economic agents do not observe the
structural shocks in real time, the econometrician, faced with the same
data as the economic agents, may not be able to identify the shocks
correctly (Blanchard et al., 2013). In fact, in such a case, in order to
4. Introducing too many variables into the model can be problematic because of the number of
parameters to be estimated and the risk of collinearity. The literature suggests using factor models or
Bayesian analysis to minimize these issues. While this method attempts to identify structural shocks in
economic policy, a different but related issue is to analyze the consequences of forecasting errors by
policy makers.
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superior information set. Also, crucially, when the economic agents
have different sets of information, the concept of a representative
agent could most definitely be misleading. Finally, the absence of a
fully informed representative agent implies that economic policy deci-
sions can reveal the policy maker's information about the state of the
economy and transmit information to the economic agents. This
mechanism is called the signalling channel of economic policy actions
(see Romer and Romer, 2000, and Melosi, 2017).5 
In models of rational expectations and full information, the
economic agents immediately process new information and, conse-
quently, their forecast errors are linear combinations of the
contemporaneous structural shocks only. In contrast, in cases where
information is imperfect, new information is only partially absorbed by
the agents over time and, therefore, the average forecast errors are a
combination of present and past structural shocks. This implies that the
forecasting errors can no longer be considered as being in themselves a
good proxy for structural shocks.
Some of these ideas have been applied to the empirical study of
technology news shocks and non-fundamental fluctuations in the
economic cycle (see for example Barsky and Sims, 2012; Blanchard
et al., 2013; and Forni et al., 2013) and of the effects of conventional
monetary policy shocks (Hubert, 2017; Hubert and Maule, 2016;
Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco, 2017) and unconventional monetary
policy shocks (Andrade and Ferroni, 2017), as well as of fiscal shocks
(Ricco, 2015; Ricco et al., 2016).
In the remainder of this section, we provide some empirical exam-
ples of how imperfect information may change the empirical
identification problem, taken from the work of the authors of this article. 
In the case of monetary policy actions, the information sets of the
central bank and of private agents may differ. When the latter are
surprised by a monetary policy decision, they have to consider whether
this surprise is due to the central bankers' assessment of macroeco-
nomic conditions or to a deviation from the monetary policy rule – i.e.
a monetary policy shock. For example, a hike in the central bank's
policy rate may signal to private agents that an inflationary shock will
5. When private agents have different beliefs because of differences in their information sets,
aggregation issues may arise and some caution is required to avoid aggregation bias.
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tion up. Conversely, the same increase in the central bank's policy rate
could be interpreted as a preference shock indicating that central
bankers want to be more hawkish, which would reduce future inflation
and output. More generally, whenever the central banker and private
agents have different information sets, the monetary policy decision
can transmit private central bank information about future macroeco-
nomic developments to the agents.
Importantly, despite extensive research, there is still much uncer-
tainty about the effects of monetary policy shocks (see Ramey, 2016).
In particular, several studies have highlighted a counter-intuitive
increase in production or in prices following a monetary tightening –
also called output and price puzzles. In Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco
(2017), the authors observe that the lack of robustness in the empirical
results in the existing literature can be due to the implicit assumption
that both the central bank and private agents enjoy perfect information
about the state of the economy. Importantly, the transfer of macroeco-
nomic information from the central bank to private agents can
generate the price puzzle highlighted in the literature.
Private agents' interpretation of monetary policy surprises is there-
fore crucial in determining the sign and magnitude of the effect of
monetary policies. Based on this intuition, Miranda-Agrippino and
Ricco (2017) propose a new approach to study the effects of monetary
policy shocks that takes into account the problem that agents face
following central bank policy announcements. In the United States,
after five years the Fed releases the macroeconomic forecasts of its
economists (the Greenbook forecasts) that were used to inform past
monetary policy decisions. This makes it possible to ex-post separate
the reactions of the financial markets to information about the state of
the economy (as reported by the Greenbook forecasts) revealed to the
public through the central bank's action, from reactions to monetary
policy shocks. The authors use these responses to study the effects of
monetary policy on the US economy in a flexible econometric model
that is robust to misspecifications.
In Chart 1, the approach described above is compared to methods
that do not take into account the transfer of information between the
central bank and the private agents. While these latter methods
generate the price puzzle, the approach taking into account the
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reduces both prices and output.
On the basis of these results and in order to study whether private
agents' interpretation of monetary policy surprises depends on the
information at their disposal, Hubert (2017) assesses whether the
central bank's publication of its macroeconomic forecasts could affect
how private agents understand monetary policy surprises, and there-
fore ultimately affect the impact of monetary policy decisions. More
specifically, this work assesses whether the term structure of inflation
expectations responds differently to decisions by the Bank of England
(BoE) based on first whether these are accompanied by the publication
of its macroeconomic forecasts (of inflation and growth) and second
whether they are corroborated or contradicted by its forecasts.6 
Chart 1. Responses of different macroeconomic variables to a restrictive 
monetary shock
Reading note: The graph shows the impulse response of several variables, over 24 months, to a contractionary
monetary shock. This monetary shock is identified in three different ways: via the average surprise of market opera-
tors on the day of the announcement (blue dots), via a narrative approach that consists of extracting the unex-
plained component of the central banks' forecasts of a change in interest rates (orange dots), and using the method
of Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco (2017), which takes into account the transfer of information (blue line).
Source: Authors' calculations. 
Industrial production Unemployment rate Inflation
Average market surprise
Narrative approach
New monetary shock
CRB Commodity prices index Interest rate at 1 year
 %
 p
o
in
ts
 
 %
 p
o
in
ts
 
Month
Month
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restrictive monetary shocks, as expected given the transmission mech-
anisms of monetary policy. The main result of Chart 2, however, is that
central bank inflation forecasts modify the impact of monetary shocks.
Monetary shocks (in this example, restrictive) have more negative
effects when they interact with a positive surprise about the central
bank's inflation forecasts. On the other hand, a restrictive monetary
shock, which interacts with a negative surprise on inflation forecasts,
has no effect on private inflation expectations.
This suggests that, when monetary shocks and forecast surprises
corroborate one another, monetary shocks have a greater negative
impact on private inflation expectations, possibly because private
agents can deduce the preference shock of the central bank and
respond more strongly. When monetary shocks and forecast surprises
6. This paper focuses on data UK because BoE projections have a specific feature that makes it
possible to identify econometrically their own effects. Indeed, the research question studied requires
that the central bank's projections are not a function of the current policy decision, so that monetary
surprises and projection surprises can be identified separately. BoE projections are conditional on the
market interest rate and not the policy rate, so the BoE projections are independent of monetary
policy decisions.
Chart 2. Responses to a restrictive monetary shock
Reading note: The graph shows the 6-month change in 1 and 2-year inflation expectations following a restrictive
monetary shock, when (a) it is corroborated by a positive surprise on the central bank inflation forecasts (black line)
(b) when it is contradicted by a negative surprise on inflation forecasts (blue line).
Source: Authors' calculations
1 year inflation expectation 2 years inflation expectation 
Restrictive monetary shock + Positive BoE inflation surprises 
Restrictive monetary shock + Negative BoE inflation surprises
Month Month
0,3
0
-0,3
0,3
0
-0,3
0                      2                      4                        6 0                      2                      4                        6
Paul Hubert and Giovanni Ricco192contradict one another, monetary shocks have no impact (or less),
possibly because private agents receive conflicting signals and are
unable to determine the direction of monetary policy. They therefore
also respond to the macroeconomic information disclosed.
These results show that informational questions, and in particular
the central banks' publication of its macroeconomic information,
which helps private agents to process the signals they receive, modify
the responses to monetary policy decisions.
 Imperfect information can also play a role in the transmission of
fiscal shocks. For example, Ricco et al. (2016) propose a study of the
effects of the communication of fiscal policy with respect to public
expenditure shocks. To do this, they calculated an index measuring the
coordination effects of policy makers' announcements on private
agents' expectations. This index is based on the dispersion of the
3-quarter ahead public expenditure forecast of professional forecasters
in the United States. The basic intuition is that communications about
the future path of fiscal policy can act as a focal point for expectations
and reduce informational frictions and thus the dispersion of forecasts
among economic agents. The results (Chart 3) indicate that in times of
low disagreement, the response of output to public expenditure shocks
is positive and significant, mainly because of the strong response of
private investment. Conversely, periods of high disagreement are
Chart 3. Responses of GDP and private investment to expansionary fiscal 
announcements conditional on the disagreement among private agents
Reading note: Impact of budget announcements in a situation of high (red) and low (blue) disagreement. The shock
corresponds to a difference of one standard deviation from the revisions of the 3-quarter forecast of public expendi-
ture. The responses to the impulse have been normalized to have a similar increase in public spending over 4 quar-
ters. The estimates are provided with a 68% confidence interval.
Source: Authors' calculations.
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Imperfect Information in Macroeconomics 193characterized by a low or no response of output. These results indicate
that informational frictions can modify the effects of economic policy
decisions.
5. Conclusion
Models with imperfect information have been widely used to study,
among other questions, how economic agents make decisions on
consumption and investment or select their asset portfolios. Another
active area of research concerns the design of optimal policies in the
presence of informational frictions. It is noteworthy that the implica-
tions of these models of imperfect information can be of great policy
relevance.
For example, Ball, Mankiw and Reis (2005) show that a price level
target is optimal in models with sticky information, while inflation
targeting is optimal in models where the prices are sticky. Paciello and
Wiederholt (2014) document how models of rational inattention
modify the optimal monetary policy. Branch, Carlson, Evans and
McGough (2009) examine how monetary policy decisions affect the
optimal frequency for updates of information sets. They show that if
the central bank is more concerned with inflation than with growth,
firms' inflation expectations may be better anchored and this may
decrease output and inflation variability. This mechanism may partially
explain the 'Great Moderation'. Angeletos and Pavan (2007) examined
issues of efficiency and optimal policy in the presence of imperfect
information and the externalities that the use of the information by an
agent imposes on other agents. Angeletos and La'O (2011) studied
optimal monetary policy in an environment in which firms' pricing and
production decisions are subject to informational frictions. They show
that perfect price stability is no longer optimal. In this context, the
optimal policy is to 'lean against the wind', that is to say, to target a
negative correlation between the price level and real economic activity.
In the wake of the financial crisis, the attention was mainly focused
on incorporating financial frictions in macroeconomic models.
However, it is also important not to underestimate the importance of
informational frictions. This article has tried to show that informational
frictions have important implications for macroeconomic models'
predictions as well as the measurement of economic policy shocks and
their effects. If these frictions are not properly taken into account, then
economic policy recommendations may be misleading.
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